Stoicon, Stoic Week, and Stoicon-Xs in 2018

Every year since 2012,  the Modern Stoicism team, in conjunction with many other people and organizations, facilitates Stoic Week and puts on a major international conference, Stoicon.  We’ll have more information and details appearing in the upcoming weeks to come, but for the present, there’s already some news to announce about what we’ll be offering this year for Stoic Week and Stoicon.  We also have some appeals and suggestions about Stoic Week and smaller Stoicon-X events and conferences.  Please consider becoming a patron of Modern Stoicism, if you want to support our work.

Stoicon 2018 – London

Stoicon is the world’s largest gathering of people interested in and (in many cases) identifying with Stoic philosophy and practices.  This year, it is being organized by John Sellars to take place in London.  Information about tickets and registration will be forthcoming within the space of the next several weeks, but the date has long been set for Saturday, September 29. 

The conference will take place in the University of London’s Senate House, in Bloomsbury, with the generous support of the Institute of Philosophy and the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London.

Our keynote speaker will be:

  • Professor A. A. Long, one of the leading scholars of Stoicism in the English-speaking world during the last fifty years

Other speakers include:

  • Professor Catharine Edwards, Roman historian and noted expert of Seneca
  • Antonia Macaro, author of More than Happiness: Buddhist and Stoic Wisdom for a Sceptical Age
  • Kai Whiting, who works on Stoicism and sustainability, and has written for the Stoicism Today blog
  • Dr Liz Gloyn, Classicist and author of a recent book on Seneca, The Ethics of the Family in Seneca
  • Dr Piotr Stankiewicz, from the University of Warsaw and a member of the Modern Stoicism team

A series of workshops will also be offered in break-out sessions. Workshop leaders will include Donald Robertson, Tim Le Bon, Chris Gill & Gabrielle Galluzzo, Greg Sadler & Andi Sciacca, Walter Matweychuk, and Greg Lopez.

There are a number of Hotels near the venue where one can book accommodation if required. The Imperial Hotels group run a number of large hotels, including The Tavistock Hotel and The Royal National Hotel. A range of smaller hotels are located on Bedford Place, including The Penn Club.  So if you are planning on attending this international gathering, keep an eye out for tickets (coming soon), and start looking into travel and accomodations

Stoic Week 2018

Stoic Week 2018 will take place this year Monday October 1st– Sunday October 7th. So you can now definitively mark your calendars, if you plan to observe Stoic Week this year (and, of course, you should!).

As always, we will provide a handbook, an online class, and a number of other resources so that individuals, groups, and institutions can try living like a Stoic for that week, on their own, through a virtual community, or with others in small groups.

Like Stoicon, Stoic Week has been going on since 2012 – you can read the story of it here.  Each year has seen a growing number of individual participants as well as participating institutions and organizations.  Stoic Week involves a number of different but complementary  goods.

First, by following the course and handbook, participants do really get an opportunity to learn about Stoicism and try it in practice.  Many participants  who are already well versed in Stoicism – myself included – take the week, the exercises and reflections, as a opportunity for a well-needed “tune-up” of one’s Stoic discipline.

Second, it offers a great opportunity to connect up with, and share stories, insights, experiences, and questions with other people equally interested in Stoicism.  For some, this takes place through local communities, such as Stoic meetups, university or community groups, or events scheduled to celebrate Stoic week.  For others, the online class provides this personal engagement.

Third, for those who want to host a Stoicism-related event, talk, or even a Stoicon-X conference, Stoic Week offers a great time to draw attention, boost participation and interest, and get some free publicity for whatever it is you’re putting together.  Whether it be get-togethers to work through the Stoic Week class together, workshops, lectures, special sessions of a meetup, or any other event, we are happy to include yours in our listings of worldwide scheduled events,

Fourth, one main activity of the Modern Stoicism organization is gathering data to determine whether studying and practicing Stoicism can be scientifically demonstrated to improve the lives of those who do so.  The Stoic Week class offers us an opportunity to do precisely that.  You can read about that research here.

Stoicon-X Events

Stoicon-X events are smaller regional conferences or events, featuring speakers and workshops for those who want to learn more about Stoicism and its contemporary applications.  Like the main conference, these are a great place to meet and have conversations with fellow modern Stoics. The idea behind Stoicon-X is that, for those people who can’t make it to the main Stoicon conference, there could be smaller, locally organized events they could participate in.

For those who might be interested in planning and hosting a Stoicon-X, we have developed a set of very useful and thorough guidelines – you can download them here.  Stoicon-X events don’t have to be all that large  – they can feature just a few talks, workshops, or other activites – the key is that they are well-organized for their participants.

Right now, we don’t have any information about upcoming Stoicon-X conferences for 2018.  If you are planning or hosting one, please contact me , and I will make sure that your Stoicon-X gets into our comprehensive listings of events for this year.

If you want to support Modern Stoicism’s work please consider becoming a patron:

Stoic Values Clarification (part 2) by Chris Gill and Tim LeBon

Two members of the Modern Stoicism team, Chris Gill and Tim LeBon, began a “Socratic Dialogue” about Stoic values as part of their workshop on Stoic Values Clarification in Stoicon 2017 in Toronto. The dialogue proved so fruitful that they decided to continue it here. . .

Tim (continuing his role as everyman):  Chris, it’s good to meet up again.

I’ve been thinking a lot about our last conversation … I agree with your Stoic view that without the virtues, a life pursuing happiness is fragile. I also agree that the virtues are very important in their own right. The thing I’m struggling with is this idea of “preferable (or preferred) indifferent”. I just can’t head my head round it. How can I be indifferent about something I prefer to happen? If I care about the well-being of my children, for example, how can I be indifferent?

Chris (the Stoic): Good to follow up our earlier conversation.

The Stoic idea of “indifferents” has always been controversial, but I think it contains some valuable insights. The point is not about you or me being indifferent. It is about things being indifferent or not. Rephrased, it is about what makes the difference (or not) as regards happiness or the good life. Virtue, the Stoics think, really makes the difference between being happy (in their sense) or not, whereas other things do not.

Of course, people naturally want well-being for those they love. And Stoics think that, other things being equal, we should do all we can to promote this. But in the end what makes the difference, as regards our happiness and those of others, is whether we act virtuously or not. For instance, if we try to combine promoting our children’s welfare with acting criminally, we will not bring about our happiness or theirs, the Stoics think.

Does this help?

Tim: I think it may. It’s the “indifferent” part I was having problems with. So it’s not about me being indifferent, it’s about the thing being ultimately irrelevant to my moral worth? Is that right? Could I replace “Preferable indifferent” with “Preferable but irrelevant to my moral worth?”. If so, that would make a lot of sense. Being healthy, wealthy, and having friends and relatives flourishing are all preferable but clearly not relevant to my moral worth.

Chris: Yes, that is more what the Stoics think.  “Moral worth” is what the Stoics would have called what is “good”, whereas being healthy and so on are not good in themselves but rather things we would reasonably prefer to have or to experience.

Two qualifications, however. “Moral worth” in modern terms suggests acting on behalf of others, rather than oneself. Stoics think that virtue does not just make you act well towards others but also makes you act well on your own behalf. Virtue benefits you as well as others.

Also, preferable things are not entirely irrelevant to moral worth. How you decide to act as regards preferable things is a key part of exercising virtue. But preferable things are “indifferent” because they do not determine your happiness or the opposite, whereas virtue does.

Tim: Before we go on to other things, a point about terminology. Chris, the phrase “preferred indifferents” is very unnatural in English. Can you tell us something about its origins in Greek or Latin, and what various other translations might be possible (perhaps less literal ones).

Chris: Yes, the ancient critics of Stoic ethics said this too about the Greek terms. Well, the term “indifferent”, as I have just explained, stems from the idea things like health and wealth do not determine happiness or its opposite, i.e. they do not make the difference between them, whereas virtue does. So they are “indifferent” in this sense. But some indifferents have positive value (it is natural to want to have them) such as health, wealth and the well being of our families. So the Stoics call them “preferred” or “preferable”, that is, things it is natural to prefer to have rather than not. All a bit clumsy, I’m afraid, but I hope the meaning is clear enough. Any other terminology, such as “bodily and external goods” (the Aristotelian phrase) gets the ideas wrong.

Tim: This is rather subtle, isn’t it?  Time for a recap I think. After our earlier discussion, I was happy with the idea that without virtue happiness is fragile. I also agreed that the virtues are intrinsically good. I am not sure I am quite there yet with the idea that virtues are the only thing intrinsically good thing.

In particular I was struggling with the idea that things other than virtues, such as our family and friends faring well, are just “preferable indifferents”.  I am reassured by the clarification that the Stoic is not indifferent to the welfare of their friends and family.  I still have a bit of a problem with the notion that friends faring well and my health are pretty much irrelevant to my happiness. I think this may be because I have a modern understanding of the term “happiness”, as by definition implying feeling good. I was more comfortable saying these things make no difference to my moral worth. You then reminded me that it’s not just about benefiting others, as “moral worth” implies. So what if I say that I agree that having or not having the preferable indifferents  makes no difference to my ability to excel at living well ? Is that a bit closer to the Stoic view?

Chris: That is much closer to the Stoic view. Happiness is living well, in fact, living the best possible human life; part of this is what we call “feeling happy”, but the Stoics think the “mood” part of happiness depends on the “life” part, that is, how you actually live. Virtue is expertise or knowledge in living well. And if you have virtue, you will be able to live well, whatever the situation you find yourself in – that is part of your expertise.

This may help with the “preferred indifferents”. A happy (good human) life will normally include caring for others, such as one’s partner and children. Stoics think it is natural for people to do this, and natural to want them to flourish. The virtuous person will do this expertly, in the way a good human being should. But his or her happiness (i.e. leading a good life) does not depend on their flourishing. Even if they suffer illness or, at worst, death, the virtuous person will deal with this as well as anyone can (that is, expertly). That is why their flourishing is a “preferred indifferent”, which does not mean it has no value (it does). Happiness (i.e. living well) depends on virtue (expertise) and not on things that just happen to us and which we cannot influence.

Tim: Thanks, that’s helpful.  I was thinking about this the other day just after playing bridge at my club and thought of an analogy – I wonder if you think it could be useful. At some card games, like bridge, you often have a trump suit. When there are trumps, the lowest trump beats the highest card of any other suit. I was wondering if we could think of virtues as being like trumps, and the indifferents as being like cards in the other suits. If, for example, spades are trumps, then the two of trumps beats the ace or king of diamonds, in the same way that being virtuous (even in a small way) is more important than, for example, becoming very rich or very famous. We could think of life as a game where the purpose is to live well, the virtues are  the trump suit, and the indifferents are of value, but not as much value as the virtues. Could that work?

Chris: That’s an interesting suggestion. Certainly, Stoics think that any exercise of virtue “trumps” acquiring any preferred indifferent, however great, if acquired without exercise of virtue. I’m a bit worried, however by your final suggestion: that both virtue and indifferents have value but the virtues, as trumps, have more. What the Stoics actually said was that preferred indifferents have value (they are worth pursuing), but that the virtues are good; that is, the value of virtue is different in kind not just in degree.

Why different in kind? Part of the reason is the difference between virtues as executive skills or forms of expertise and indifferents as conditions of life (being rich, famous, healthy, having a flourishing family or not). But also virtue/expertise is good because it always benefits us and other people, and exercising it makes life go well under any circumstances. That is not true of indifferents; their contribution to a happy life depends on how they are used. That is why the value of virtue differs in kind from that of indifferents.

Tim:  Are you saying that we have two things here – things that are good and things that are of value? Or is it that living according the virtues is reliably and always good, whereas pursuing the indifferents is only good if done in a virtuous way?

Chris: I think the key point is that “good” means “beneficial”. The virtues (always) benefit us because they enable us to achieve happiness. The preferred indifferents are not in themselves beneficial; they have a positive value, but whether they contribute to a happy (well-lived) life depends on how they are used. So there are two different kinds of thing: virtues (good) and preferred indifferents (valuable but not good). The good human life may have preferred indifferents within it but they do not make the life good; that is the role of the virtues.

Tim: When you say preferred indifferents are valuable, is it more accurate to say “potentially valuable?”

Chris: Yes, I think that is right. In general, preferred indifferents, such as health and property, have value in themselves – natural value, the Stoics say, that is, value for human beings in general. But whether or not that value is realised in any given situation depends on whether it is used in a virtuous way or not. If we decide to gain money in a criminal or exploitative way, the money does not have value, in the Stoic sense, and does not contribute to a good life.

Tim: Can I take you back to an earlier point you made. You said “Happiness is living well, in fact, living the best possible human life; part of this is what we call ‘feeling happy’, but the Stoics think the ‘mood’ part of happiness depends on the ‘life’ part, that is, how you actually live”. Is this an empirical claim about mood depending on virtue? If so, that would be something that could be tested by modern empirical science in a way that was not possible for the ancient Greeks or Romans?

Chris: For the Stoics this claim was based on philosophical grounds. They defined happiness in a certain way (the best possible human life) and saw having good emotions (including joy) as a corollary or by-product of leading this kind of life. They did not conduct empirical studies to support this claim. However, they did think it was true and that it corresponded to human nature and human behaviour as they saw it in real life. In the modern world, of course, we can conduct such empirical studies and the questionnaires and surveys that we carry out in connection with Stoic week aim to bring out the link between adopting Stoic ethical principles and our pattern of emotions and moods. I guess we should bear in mind that for the Stoics virtue and happiness are ideal states, rarely if ever reached, and the achievable aim is to make progress in the right direction. But the Stoics thought it makes a big difference which direction we point our lives in – towards virtue or vice – so making progress certainly matters for them.

Tim:   This has been very helpful, Chris, I wonder if we have time today for just one more thing. What does Stoic decision-making look like? Conventional decision-making might involve weighing up all the consequences of a choice and choosing the one that has the most overall benefit. For example, if I am choosing between two jobs, I might weigh up money, fringe benefits, travel time and perhaps, if I am ethically minded, the benefit the work may bring to others. In other words, the conventional decision-maker would give a large weighting to preferable indifferents.   How would a Stoic make this decision?  How much would the indifferents count for? And does the Stoic use practical wisdom when making the choice between two indifferents?

Chris: In many ways, Stoic decision-making is just like conventional deliberation as you describe it. Stoics should take account of the relative value of things like health and money and status, and they should also take account of the impact of the decision on themselves and on others. So they do give weight to preferable indifferents, and to the value they have for us and for others. But they also know that what really matters is making the decisions virtuously – that is, wisely, justly, bravely, and with self-control. That is what they are aiming at – not just to pile up preferred indifferents for themselves. The overall aim is to lead the best possible human life, which they also see as the happy life. And the way to do that is to make practical decisions virtuously. Of course, this depends on learning about what makes for virtuous action, and what counts as a good human and happy life. But that’s what Stoic ethics is all about!

Chris Gill is Emeritus Professor of Ancient Thought at the University of Exeter. He has written extensively on ancient philosophy. His books which focus on Stoicism include The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought and Naturalistic Psychology in Galen & Stoicism

Tim LeBon is the author of Wise Therapy and Activate Your Potential With Positive Psychology.  He can be contacted via email at  His website is

Is Stoic Practice Just Easier For Certain People? by Leah Goldrick

A reader of my blog recently wrote to me to ask if I think that practicing Stoicism is easier for men. The poor woman had experienced terrible postpartum depression after the birth of her son and still wasn’t feeling like herself several years later. She was very distressed about how her depression has affected her Stoic practice. Her husband on the other hand, seemed to have no problem being nonplussed about almost everything. He was calm even even in the face of things that caused her to feel depressed.

Her question was timely for me. I’m pregnant, and I have been finding myself more upset than I might typically be in various circumstances. This concurrence of events lead to me thinking about what they might mean in a Stoic context.

Now, to be clear, even though these experiences I just mentioned – pregnancy, birth and the postpartum period – are uniquely female, I prefer to frame the question in terms of personality or temperament rather than in terms of gender. I’m more interested in analyzing how Stoicism can help both males and females than I am in focusing on gender differences, which has unfortunately become a wedge issue.

So, does Stoic practice in fact come more naturally to people with certain temperaments or abilities? The question ultimately raises a series of other questions. First, how much control do we have over how the body affects the mind at various times during our lives? Do our temperaments actually matter to Stoic practice? And finally, are Stoics born or made? Let’s examine these ideas in more detail.

Can We Control How the Body Affects the Mind?

In the Discourses 1.1, Epictetus establishes his famous dichotomy of control, arguing that some things are up to us and others are not. The body is categorized by Epictetus as not in our control or at least not fully within our control. But Epictetus suggests that the mind is within our control.

This leads us to wonder how much control we have over the various ways the body might affect the mind – in terms of hormone changes, neurochemistry, blood sugar levels, and and other bodily functions which can directly affect our mood and emotions. It seems clear that we don’t have complete control over the biological functions that can trigger irrational emotions or passions – defined by the Stoics as anger, hatred, fear, depression, strong desire, and so forth.

But this isn’t the whole story. Regardless of where our emotions come from, the Stoics argued that the first movement of passions is largely involuntary. This is true for everyone, not just for people currently experiencing mood issues and frequent irrational emotions. In On Anger II.4.1-2, Seneca suggests:

I wish to instruct you in how passions get started, develop, and reach the point of exasperation. The first movement is involuntary, and it is like a preparation, or a threat, by the passion; the second movement is voluntary and controllable, and it consists in thinking that vengeance is necessary, because I have been offended, or that someone has to be punished, because he has offended; the third movement is arrogant, it does not want vengeance because it is necessary, but because it wants it, it has already annihilated reason. We cannot avoid the first impulse by reason, in the same way as we cannot avoid those physical reactions I mentioned earlier, yawning when others yawn, or closing our eyes when someone suddenly points a finger at them: these things cannot be overcome by reason; perhaps they may be attenuated by habit, or a constant attention. But the second movement, the one that springs from deliberation, is also countered by deliberation.

So while we might not be able to avoid all of the physical or biochemical triggers of our passions, we have control over the second and third stages where reason comes into play. We can take a step back and deliberate with ourselves as Seneca suggests. We might remind ourselves that we are probably feeling especially irritable because we haven’t eaten in many hours and our blood sugar is low – a phenomenon colloquially referred to as being “hangry.” Or we may have woken up in a very sad mood. We can remind ourselves of the things that we have to be grateful for in our lives.

Maybe this is easier said than done, but we do have some control over our thoughts and we can work to direct them as Seneca suggests. And while this whole process of managing assent to emotions is more involved for those who seem to experience frequent irrational passions, there is a positive dimension here too; it means that we will have more opportunity to better ourselves using Stoic techniques, which segues nicely into the next topic.

Do Our Temperaments Matter When it Comes to Practicing Stoicism?

In Discourses 1.2, on how a man on every occasion can maintain his proper character, Epictetus notes that while our natural strengths and weaknesses do affect us, we should nonetheless stay true to our own characters rather than seeking perfection:

But that which is great and superior perhaps belongs to Socrates and such as are like him. Why then, if we are naturally such, are not a very great number of us like him? Is it true then that all horses become swift, that all dogs are skilled in tracking footprints? What then, since I am naturally dull, shall I, for this reason, take no pains? I hope not. Epictetus is not superior to Socrates; but if he is not inferior, this is enough for me; for I shall never be a Milo [a great athlete], and yet I do not neglect my body; nor shall I be a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property; nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after anything because we despair of reaching the highest degree.

The sense of this passage seems to be that first of all, there are few who are great like Socrates – both extremely rational and willing to die for integrity. He is the exception rather than the rule. But the rest of us shouldn’t give up on trying to lead a good life because we aren’t just like Socrates or yet a sage.

Epictetus may not be Socrates, but that is no reason for him not to be the best Epictetus possible. He need not compare himself to anyone exceptional in order to be virtuous, or give up on trying to improve himself just because he isn’t the epitome of perfect reason.

Are Stoics Born or Made?

Epictetus continues to offer insight into the question of how we develop excellence. He implies that Stoics are made via practice regardless of any seeming good fortune in terms of temperament or ability (Discourses 1:2):

Some person asked, how then shall every man among us perceive what is suitable to his character? How, he replied, does the bull alone, when the lion has attacked, discover his own powers and put himself forward in defence of the whole herd? It is plain that with the powers the perception of having them is immediately conjoined: and, therefore, whoever of us has such powers will not be ignorant of them. Now a bull is not made suddenly, nor a brave man; but we must discipline ourselves in the winter for the summer campaign, and not rashly run upon that which does not concern us.

Here Epictetus notes that the great strength of the bull didn’t just appear overnight. Even though he may have been born a bull, it took the him years of development, building his muscles and so on, to become the mature creature that he is today.

Like the bull, we aren’t born brave or born Stoic philosophers. We must build ourselves up in order to become what we are meant to be, which requires work over the course of many years. Epictetus goes on to suggest that we make use of the challenging times in our lives to develop necessary courage and discipline. We can work at responding to challenges with increasing levels of virtue and skill, while turning our attention away from things beyond our control.

So yes, perhaps there are those rare individuals who possess naturally equanimous temperaments or special abilities. But that is no reason for us to measure ourselves by their standard, or to give up on becoming the best version of ourselves that we can. Other people’s good fortune is squarely beyond our control. And as Epictetus notes, even these seemingly exceptional people didn’t just become excellent overnight – they spent years developing into what they are. We must conclude that all of us must work to better ourselves regardless of any good fortune in terms of temperament or ability.

Epictetus leaves us with an optimistic message which shuts down any notions of perfectionism. There is no point in beating ourselves up over our shortcomings. Regardless of our individual struggles or our natural temperaments, as long as we are making progress, that is good enough for Epictetus. It should be good enough for us too.


Leah Goldrick became a practicing Stoic as a result of her ongoing inquiry into the Western wisdom traditions. She holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Philosophy and a Masters in Library and Information Science from Rutgers University. She is a part-time children’s librarian and blogger. She lives in the United States with her husband and son. Her website is Common Sense Ethics, which now has an associated YouTube channel.

Dealing With Difficult People at Work: Stoic Strategies by Greg Sadler

As editor of Stoicism Today, each year I ask those who spoke or gave a workshop at the main Stoicon or at one of the Stoicon-X events to provide a piece for our readership, the vast majority of whom cannot attend these events.  Just to put it into perspective, the attendees at Stoicon number in the hundreds.  A big Stoicon-X event might get a hundred.  By contrast most of our blog posts here get tens – and occasionally, hundreds – of thousands of reads.  So when our presenters and organizers are good enough to supply transcripts or summaries  of their talks, workshops, or other activities, I’m very happy to set them here in Stoicism Today.

As a fairly recent addition (joining officially in 2016) to the Modern Stoicism team, I have also  greatly enjoyed participating in Stoicon 2016 and 2017 (and in Stoicon-X Toronto 2017).  At both of those Stoicons, I provided one of the workshops during the breakout sessions.  Accordingly, after having asked many of our speakers to make their own contributions here in Stoicism Today, it is about time for me to put in the work required to add my own piece here about my 2017 Stoicon workshop, “Dealing With Difficult People at Work:  Stoic Strategies”.

If you’d like to see a videorecording of that workshop session, you can do so here.

Structure and Motivation of the Workshop

When Donald Robertson proposed “Stoicism at Work” as the theme for Stoicon 2017, I knew exactly what I wanted to focus on for the workshop.  There are a lot of challenges, irritants, and obstacles that arise within the context of modern work.  Some of the most difficult stem from our interactions and relationships with other people.  I’ve certainly dealt with – sometimes successfully, sometimes less so! – many difficult people in my own career.  And many of my own clients come to me troubled by how to handle these sorts of workplace issues.

I should mention that in its original design, the workshop was a team presentation, with my wife and partner, Andi Sciacca, as my co-presenter.  We designed the workshop together, and had planned to deliver it that way as well.  Unfortunately, due to some health matters at the time, she wasn’t cleared to fly to Toronto.  Given Andi’s qualifications, work-experience, and talents (which would require another blog post to outline), the workshop attendees perhaps got the proverbial short end of the stick with just me presenting!

Clearly difficult people at work was good topic to center upon in workshop format. After all, Stoic philosophy is practical, and should be providing help for people struggling with life-issues. I’d written a post in the series we ran leading up to Stoicon 2017, “Dealing With The Unduly Demanding In the Workplace,” addressing one particular type of “difficult person” – drawing in part on personal experience – and I was looking forward to discussing additional aspects of the workshop with the conference-goers.  As it turned out, the workshop was a big draw.  The room was packed with participants, and they brought some excellent questions, observations, and stories to the session!

The workshop was 90 minutes long, ranged over a lot of material, and included a number of side-discussions, so I am just going to summarize it here, talking about some portions in a bit more detail.

We originally divided the workshop up into the following activities:

  • Discussion – challenges for the Stoic and Stoicism in the workplace
  • Exercise – what main challenges are you encountering?
  • Presentation – several common types of difficult people in workplaces
  • Exercise – your top three difficult persons
  • Presentation – useful Stoic practices within situations involving difficult people
  • Presentation – useful Stoic practices before and after situations involving difficult people
  • Role-Playing Exercises – using Stoic strategies
  • Time Dedicated to Q&A and Discussion

The role-playing exercises would have required both Andi and I, so they were dropped from the actual workshop as delivered.  As it turned out, each part of the workshop drew us into a good bit of discussion, so we used all the time allotted even without those exercises.

The discussions were particularly engaging, I would say, for several reasons.  First, work and the people of the workplace are matters practically everyone can relate to.  As far as I know, there weren’t any participants in the workshop who didn’t already have considerable experience stemming from their working life.  Second, aggravations, challenges, and difficulties in the workplace are practically speaking, if not infinite, certainly vast in both quantity and type!  So there was a lot of “raw material” that we could apply Stoic principles and practices to, and that leads into the third reason.  As it turns out, although the ancient Stoics have no contact with or awareness of  the modern workplace – how could they? – they actually say quite a lot that turns out to be quite useful in dealing with difficult people.

Some Challenges in Applying Stoicism in the Workplace

Before launching into the workshop proper, I thought it could be useful to pause and consider a few common challenges that can arise when we are attempting to apply our Stoic practices and principles to the workplace environment.  The goal was not to attempt resolving these – there was definitely not enough time for that! – but just to highlight them so that they were out in the open.  Each of these probably merits a good bit of further discussion later on and elsewhere.

The first of these has to do with “indifferents” – adiaphora, in Greek – those things that, strictly speaking don’t have moral value in themselves, whether positive or negative.  At first glance, it can seem as if nearly everything that goes on, motivates people, or has some place, in the modern workplace is really some type of indifferent from the Stoic perspective.  Money, perks, positions, reputation, products and services, even the proverbial “bottom line”.  We can ask ourselves how Stoic we being if we focus on those sorts of matters.  An initial answer might be “not at all,” and we might then feel as if we ought to withdraw our attention or care from those.

A closely connected second matter – really another way of looking at those same things – is that those indifferents are also “externals,” and strictly speaking seem to be things that lie outside of our control, our power, or our business, if you like (all three of those are decent ways to translate Epictetus’ “ouk ep humon” in the dichotomy of control passages).  So should practitioners of Stoicism allow themselves to become concerned about those things outside of the scope of our agency?

Third, turning to one matter that clearly is up to us, and has intrinsic moral value – whether or not we develop and display the virtues – how do we translate these into the workplace?  Can we really make it all about virtue?  Or expanding and unpacking it a bit, should we make it all about our duties, or fulfilling our roles?

Fourth, if we make virtues, duties, and roles central in how we approach the workplace – and particularly our fellow human beings in the workplace – aren’t we setting ourselves up for exploitation  by others in that workplace?  Do we put ourselves at a disadvantage by being too understanding or accommodating, by fulfilling our duties, even if others don’t reciprocate?

To raise a fifth concern, justice is one of the four virtues for the Stoics.  And there can be a lot of things in the workplace that either seem or actually are unjust.  To what extent are we called upon, if we want to practice Stoicism, to say something or do something about the injustices we run across?

A sixth difficulty almost goes without saying – but it can be easy to forget, especially for people starting out in practicing Stoicism.  The other people in in any given workplace are very likely not going to be Stoics. It is possible that you might find some allies or supporters, but often you’ll find people motivated in all sorts of other ways, many of which are going to be quite at odds with Stoicism. And quite a few of them will turn out to be difficult people for the would-be-Stoic!

A Partial Typology of Difficult People

When it comes to general types of people – classifying them along the lines of their characteristic behavior, motivations, choices, priorities, emotional responses, or practical reasoning – there are a vast variety.  Really, that’s not a surprise, when you consider how adaptable human beings are, and how many different things we take an interest in, or orient ourselves by.  You can run into all sorts in the workplace.

Some of them definitely fall into the broad category of “difficult people”.  That is a relational and also a relative term.  People are more or less difficult, and they are difficult for or to some people, and not to others.  I provided what is admittedly only a partial listing sorting out a number of different kinds of troublesome people – I’m sure others can contribute many other additional overlooked categories to this enumeration!  Here are those that I brought up as classes of people who make the workplace difficult, some of which we discussed in the workshop:

  • Chronically negative people
  • Drama kings and queens
  • Bullies, sadists, and abusers
  • Unduly demanding people
  • People with annoying traits or habits
  • Disorganized, unprepared, and flakey
  • Greedy, self-centered, and exploitative
  • Contentious and argumentative people
  • Status-obsessed and overly competitive
  • Entitled, unmotivated, and lazy people
  • The incompetent and uncoachable
  • Over-social, hyper-sharing, and gossipy
  • Passive-aggressive and victims
  • Rageaholics, over-sensitive, and other angry
  • Back-stabbers and promise-breakers
  • Bad influences and enablers
  • Controllers, corallers, and “team-builders”

I should point out a few things about these categories.  First, although I have given them what I hope are fairly clear and suggestive names, each could use a bit of explanation (which in interests of space, I won’t attempt here).  Second, some of them might overlap or bland into each other, in two ways.  They might intersect to some degree conceptually.  and of course, in real live persons, any given human being might fit into multiple categories.  Third, you can find difficult people who can be rightly placed in these rubrics at any level of a company, organization, or institution.  They might be a boss, an executive, a manager, an employee, a customer, a vendor, a supplier, even a temp.

From a Stoic perspective the question isn’t whether such people exist.  It isn’t even whether labeling them in these ways is somehow wrong, or unfair, or offensive – read around in Marcus, Epictetus, and Seneca, and see how many people they are willing to label along similar lines!  The real question is how we can deal with those difficult people in productive and positive ways.  What resources does Stoicism afford us?

Useful Stoic Practices In Dealing With The Difficult

A good portion of the workshop was devoted to precisely that question.  What practices can we draw upon from Stoicism that will enable us to better handle situations involving difficult people in the workplace?  I broke those practices down into two sets – those to use within situations, and those better used before or after situations.  We had a good bit of discussion about some of these, as you’ll find when watching the recording of the workshop session.

Here are some of the useful practices that can be used within situations, with some brief explanations:

  • Dealing with appearances as such – not immediately giving assent to impressions or appearances that present themselves to you, but instead seeing them in proper perspective.
  • Deconstructing things into their parts – taking matters you find troubling, provocative of negative emotions, or appealing to your desires, and reminding yourself of what they really are.
  • Distinguishing what is or isn’t in your control – employing and reminding yourself of the dichotomy of control, and as best you can dissociating your desires and aversions from those that are not in your control.
  • Picking things up by the right handle – choosing how you frame the matters that you encounter in ways that you will be able to effectively deal with those matters, for instance by focusing upon your own duties and roles.
  • Understanding others without excusing – realizing that people think, feel, talk, and act as they do because that seems good or reasonable to them, even if it isn’t, and even if it is dead wrong.
  • Reminding self of values and costs of things – these costs include, for example, what it takes for you to be undisturbed by what would otherwise set you off.
  • Focusing on bigger-picture perspective – reminding yourself that if you step away from your personalized perspective things and people will not seem as important or as disturbing.
  • Sticking up for what is right in right ways – using the virtues as a guide, restricting excesses and properly orienting the stands that one feels compelled to take.

Here are some of the others that can be used before and after situations:

  • Examining your own desires and aversions – this sort of honest self-scrutiny allows you to really grasp what motivates you.  Those motivations might be healthy and rightly directed, or they might need some work on your part, if you are finding yourself overly invested in what you could look at as indifferents.
  • Reminding yourself you deal with people – before and after you wind up in difficult situations, you can remind yourself of precisely that truth, that you are dealing with actual human beings who have their own histories, habits, relationships.  These are rarely people as you would want them to be.
  • Working to gradually change your habits – generally they ways in which we think and feel are in part products of habits we have developed.  In dealing with difficult people, we may have already developed bad habits that continue to make those situations difficult for us
  • Engaging in negative visualization – both as a regular practice, and before going into a situation that you know will likely involve difficulty, you can imagine what might occur in that situation, consider whether it is likely to be as bad as you fear, and think about what resources you have to deal with it.
  • Reminding yourself of larger part-wholes – as human beings, from the Stoic perspective, we are all parts of larger wholes, just as the organs of our body are parts of a greater whole.  Taking that perspective can help us see others and ourselves as involved in something bigger.
  • Spending some time with the virtuous – especially when dealing with difficult people, we need to involve ourselves with people who provide us with positive interactions.  This can be done in person, through various media, or even virtually when we read and place ourselves in conversation with Stoic authors.
  • Tracking and reflecting on how you do – engaging in some daily reflection and self-scrutiny, whether just mentally or in journaling, allows you not just to track your progress.  It also can help you to gradually gain insights about additional things you might need to focus on.
  • Taking joy in your progress and successes – this I think is particularly important, not least since you are likely not going to get much of this from others.  Stoicism views positive emotions like joy as good for us, and feeling genuine happiness when we succeed or make progress helps keep us engaged in doing that more and more.


Gregory Sadler is the Editor of the Stoicism Today blog.  He is also the president and founder of ReasonIO, a company established to put philosophy into practice, providing tutorial, coaching, and philosophical counseling services, and producing educational resources.  He has created over 100 videos on Stoic philosophy, regularly speaks and provides workshops on Stoicism, and is currently working on several book projects.

On Vegetarianism and Stoicism by Jeremy Corter

Recently, I got into a debate over vegetarianism on a Stoic group on Facebook about the morality of eating meat. One gentlemen insisted that eating meat was against human nature and that, given our intelligence, we shouldn’t debase ourselves in partaking meat. Many, including myself, disagreed with him. But despite his occasional insulting words (calling people who ate meat “corpse-eaters”), I found it difficult to defeat his arguments. After all, he was correct in saying we could get everything we need from eating a plant-based diet (complete nourishment, health, and even pleasurable food) and what’s more, there does seem to be a bit of a Stoic tradition of vegetarianism. I thanked the man for arguing his point, because it got me wondering: why does it seem that of the handful of Stoics we know of, half were vegetarians for at least some time in their lives? And why of those, only one, Musonius, made it a point of discussion?

Eat Your Veggies?

As it turns out, Stoicism and vegetarianism might not mix so well together after all.

On the surface, there seems to be some correlation. Zeno ate a simple diet that contained no meat, Seneca wrote about eating a vegetarian diet in one of his letters, and Musonius Rufus straight out told his students eating meat tainted the soul. However, any correlations break down quick. Zeno’s “vegetarianism” seemed about living simply rather than sparing animals (and, as we’ll get to, he might have argued against vegetarianism). Seneca was a vegetarian, and stopped being one, before becoming Stoic, so Stoicism didn’t influence his decision. It is only Musonius where we see a Stoic teach vegetarianism, but even here, his teachings might have been a mix of several schools when it comes to this point.

What is Vegetarianism, Anyway?

According to The Vegetarian Resource Group,

Vegetarians do not eat meat, fish, and poultry. … Among the many reasons for being a vegetarian are health, environmental, and ethical concerns; dislike of meat; non-violent beliefs; compassion for animals; and economics.

Of course, it isn’t so much the question of what vegetarians eat, but rather why. Is a person vegetarian because they don’t eat meat, or are they vegetarian for the reasons why they don’t? It would seem to me that vegetarianism isn’t defined simply by the lack of meat-eating, but also by the reasons.

To me, it’s like the question, “If someone acts like a Stoic, but doesn’t know about Stoicism, are they Stoic?” Simply acting Stoic isn’t enough because one can disagree with Stoic philosophy and still end up acting like one. So, a person eating a vegetarian diet may disagree with the reasons why people end up vegetarian. They just happen to not to eat meat. This is important because, as we’ll get to shortly, the early Stoics may have argued against not eating animals. This is even the case for Zeno, who famously didn’t eat much at all, let alone meat.

The Early Stoa: Zeno’s Simple Diet and…Cannibalism?

Zeno, according to Diogenes Laertius, ate a simple diet:

He used to eat little loaves and honey and to drink a little wine of good bouquet.

Zeno’s eating habits were well-known enough to earn him a jab by the comedian poet and playwright Philemon. In a piece titled Philosophoi (Philosophers), Philemon wrote:

This man adopts a new philosophy.
He teaches to go hungry: yet he gets
Disciples. One sole loaf of bread his food;
His best dessert dried figs; water his drink.

Zeno had a bit of a reputation with his diet, at least enough for it to mentioned by a few people. However, while there is no mention of meat consumption in any of this, we mustn’t take this to mean that Zeno espoused vegetarianism. In fact, according to Johannes Haussleiter, in his book Der Vegetarismus in der Antike[1], the early Stoics argued against vegetarianism.

Now, to be sure, Zeno himself doesn’t seem like he stood against vegetarianism. While Theophilus of Antioch states Zeno advocated for cannibalism—a decidedly anti-vegetarian idea—Johannes believes Theophilus’s statement is likely made up, though as we’ll see, the issue isn’t gone for good. Johannes goes on to say that if Zeno were asked about vegetarianism, he would have taken a practical stance, which would have ended up with Zeno becoming more of a random vegetarian. By this, Johannes means to say that Zeno’s diet was about frugality, not protecting animals. It makes sense that, if meat was available to him, Zeno would have allowed himself to eat it. This is illustrated by a story Diogenes writes about Zeno. At a dinner party, Zeno prepared to eat a big fish by himself to cure a glutton, by not offering him any. It’s still foggy at this point, but if Zeno is willing to eat animal meat to make a point, it’s hard to pin him as a strict vegetarian.

Where we see anti-vegetarian ideas take shape starts more with Chrysippus. According to Cicero, writing in De Legibus, he quotes Chrysippus as saying:

For the convenience and benefit of man, nature has given such abundance of things that their products have been given to us intentionally, not by accident; not only what fruits and berries produce through the fertility of the earth, but also the animals, because it is clear that they are created partly for the benefit of man, partly for their benefit, partly for food.

We also see another philosopher, Porphyry, argue against Chrysippus in his book, On Abstinence from the Flesh of Living Beings. That book, from what I can see, is only in Latin. However, Johannes provides a quote of Chrysippius from that book that also provides a bit of an idea of how the early Stoics thought about using animals as food:

The gods created us humans only for their sake and for us, but the animals only for our sake: the steeds, that they lead the wars with us, the dogs, that they help us hunt, panthers, bears, and lions for the exercise of our bravery, but the pig—and therein lies the most agreeable favor of the gods—was created only to be sacrificed, and God, as it were, added salt to his flesh, by giving us a wealth of food. But in order to have abundance of soup and subsidiary dishes, he has created all sorts of shells, snails, jellyfish, and various kinds of birds, for no other reason than to offer a great part of himself to enjoyment, still surpassing the mother’s breast and with these joys and pleasures filling the earthly space.[2]

Here we see that Chrysippius saw the animals as created for us and to be used by us. Horses went to war with us, dogs helped us hunt, and the more dangerous animals made us braver. The others? To eat for enjoyment.

And, as another blow to the idea that the early Stoics were against meat-eating, the idea of cannibalism is brought up yet again, this time by the more reputable sources of Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus. Diogenes states that Chrysippius “gives instructions in a thousand lines to consume the dead.” And Sextus states in Against the Mathematicians:

In the work on righteousness, Chrysippus asserts that if a part of the limb useful for food is chopped off, one should not bury it or throw it away, but consume it so that it becomes another part of ours.

Seneca: Vegetarian and Stoic (Just Not at Once)

We now look at Seneca the Younger, a man who admits being a vegetarian in his youth.

In Letter CVIII, he writes about how, after exposure to Pythagorean philosophy, he adopted vegetarianism for some time. eating meat was akin to cannibalism. Seneca seemed to find it quite enjoyable, too, but he was forced to stop. This is what he says in his letter about his vegetarianism:

I was imbued with this teaching, and began to abstain from animal food; at the end of a year the habit was as pleasant as it was easy. I was beginning to feel that my mind was more active; though I would not to-day positively state whether it really was or not. Do you ask how I came to abandon the practice? It was this way: The days of my youth coincided with the early part of the reign of Tiberius Caesar. Some foreign rites were at that time being inaugurated, and abstinence from certain kinds of animal food was set down as a proof of interest in the strange cult. So at the request of my father, who did not fear prosecution, but who detested philosophy, I returned to my previous habits; and it was no very hard matter to induce me to dine more comfortably.

According to James Romm, in his book Dying Every Day, a bit of xenophobia took hold of Rome and led to Jewish rites being banned. Because vegetarianism “looked uncomfortably similar to a kosher [diet],” Seneca’s father might have pushed him more on fears of prosecution than Seneca lets on. Still, it seems rather clear that Seneca was, at some point during his life, a vegetarian. However, this doesn’t support the idea that Stoics were vegetarians down the road.

Remember, Seneca learned of vegetarianism from his teacher, Sotion. While Sotion did teach Seneca about Stoicism, he used Pythagorean arguments for vegetarianism. As we saw, there simply weren’t any early Stoic arguments against meat-eating, so we can’t say that Stoicism influenced Seneca in this regard. And, honestly, it doesn’t matter all that much if Seneca ever returned to his vegetarian ways when he got older. The fact doesn’t change: it would have been the Pythagoreans, not the Stoics, that gave him his vegetarian foundation.

The Emperor and the Slave

Now, while Musonius Rufus is next in line when it comes to the Stoics, we’re going to save him for last, as he is the only one out of the group that advocated for vegetarianism in his teachings. For now, we’ll turn our attentions to Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus.

We don’t have direct evidence from Epictetus about whether he followed his teacher or not when it comes to vegetarianism. However, we do know that, unlike Musonius, Epictetus makes no provisions against eating meat. In fact, the only thing Epictetus calls for is its moderation, in the Enchiridion:

Provide things relating to the body no further than mere use; as meat, drink, clothing, house, family. But strike off and reject everything relating to show and delicacy.

Epictetus also points out that some animals were made to be eaten, as per Providence, as seen in the Discourses:

Well then God constitutes every animal, one to be eaten, another to serve for agriculture, another to supply cheese, and another for some like use; for which purposes what need is there to understand appearances and to be able to distinguish them?

This line is like the one Chrysippius gives, reinforcing the idea that the Stoics believed that the animals were given us for our own use, including the eating of. It seems the only rule that Epictetus gives towards meat is moderation.

When it comes to Marcus Aurelius, we enter some muddy waters. His Mediations refers to animals and meat in a few different places. In Book 10, we see a statement that seems vegetarian in nature:

A spider is proud when it has caught a fly, and another when he has caught a poor hare, and another when he has taken a little fish in a net, and another when he has taken wild boars, and another when he has taken bears, and another when he has taken Sarmatians. Are not these robbers, if thou examinest their opinions?

The wording sounds as if anyone taking a life—from flies all the way up to people—are nothing more than robbers. Even in the case of spiders catching food, he seems to have little respect for anything that takes a life. Yet, a few lines later, we get this:

Imagine every man who is grieved at anything or discontented to be like a pig which is sacrificed and kicks and screams.

In this instance, we see a different attitude towards slaughtering animals. Now, there’s an insult to the man who is aggrieved for acting like a pig getting slaughtered with reluctance. If we remember the Chyrsippus quote from before, pigs were “created” to be sacrificed. A man feeling aggrieved about anything is like the pig trying to fight its fate. Why use this analogy if he didn’t believe it was a proper one? At the very least, it doesn’t reflect a vegetarian view of pigs.

Another passage shows Marcus having to deal with meat:

When we have meat before us and such eatables we receive the impression, that this is the dead body of a fish, and this is the dead body of a bird or of a pig; and again, that this Falernian is only a little grape juice, and this purple robe some sheep’s wool dyed with the blood of a shell-fish: such then are these impressions, and they reach the things themselves and penetrate them, and so we see what kind of things they are.

It seems indictive from the wording (say “we” instead of “others”) that Marcus was reminding himself that, when he was eating meat, he should remind himself of what it truly was. Interestingly, when I debated the vegetarian mentioned in the beginning, he also made the same point (and led to his “corpse-eater” comments). It seems that at least some vegetarians would agree with how Marcus views meat, though it seems clear it didn’t stop Marcus from eating meat.

Musonius Rufus: Vegetarian or Raw Foodist?

Of all the Stoics whose writings still exist, Musonius stands above the others in many ways. He’s more practical than Seneca, more prescriptive than Epictetus, and more of a common man than Marcus. And, unlike everyone else, he is the only one to teach vegetarianism as part of his lessons.

In Musonius Rufus, Lectures and Sayings, there is a two-part lecture that Musonius gives about food. It’s made clear that he thinks meat isn’t human food, but it’s also clear that cooking isn’t the best for people, either:

And what is suitable for us is food from things which the earth produces: the various grains and other plants can nourish a human being quite well. Also nourishing is food from domestic animals which we don’t slaughter. The most suitable of these foods, though, are the ones we can eat without cooking: fruits in season, certain vegetables, milk, cheese, and honeycombs. … Even those food that requiring cooking, including grains and some vegetables, are not unsuitable; all are proper food for a human being.

These few lines tell us two things about Musonius: he wasn’t a vegan and he thought raw foods were best, though not totally against cooking some foods. But, we still must answer a critical question: was Musonius a vegetarian for the typical vegetarian reasons, or is he more like Zeno, his diet less about animal welfare and more about simplicity?

As it turns out, Musonius is more like Zeno in that it isn’t about the animals, but he has a different reason than Zeno in his choice. Musonius thought that meat was “too crude and more suitable for wild beasts.” He also said that meat slowed our mental activity and that the fumes from cooking the meat is “too smoky and darken the soul.” He also asserts that because humans are the most like the gods, we should eat like they do. As “the vapors coming from earth and water are enough for them”, we, too, should only eat “the lightest and more pure food.” Ultimately, this will make our soul “both pure and dry” which, quoting Heraclitus, will make it “best and wisest.”

Moreover, Musonius’s real disdain seems more about the act of cooking and gluttony. He laments the popularity of cookbooks and complains that there are “more cooks than farmers.” As for gluttons, he states “they resemble pigs or dogs more than humans.” He makes no mention about the welfare of animals and often uses the imagery of animals to insult people.

Vegetarianism and Stoicism: Not So Perfect Together?

When I first started this piece of writing, I saw what seemed to be evidence that Stoics were vegetarian, and that Stoic philosophy supported this. After doing some better research, I see a new, more nuanced picture.

Simply put, Stoicism and vegetarianism are two separate philosophies. Stoic teachings never denounced eating animals and, in fact, often stated that animals were there for us to use. Musonius and Seneca, as we’ve seen, are the only two Stoics we know of that were vegetarians, but neither cite any Stoic arguments for being so. Seneca cites Pythagoras and it would be safe to think that Musonius would have been aware of the same reasons.

The thing is, there seems to be two parts in which we can view vegetarianism. There’s the philosophy part, which often deals with the welfare of animals and the impact of the meat industry on animals, people, and the planet. This is the part where Stoicism and vegetarianism don’t mix. The Stoics felt that animals were there for human use, including for the use of food. This isn’t to say that the Stoics would have been in favor of factory farming or animal abuse. The Stoics thought that animals had souls, not like a human’s, but a soul nonetheless. Maybe I’m overthinking this part, but I’m suspecting that if they truly thought this, a Stoic would lean towards, if not protecting animals, at the very least not abusing and exploiting them.

But there’s also the diet part, which can be simply taken as not eating meat. What we see here isn’t a contradiction between vegetarianism and Stoicism, just a lack of opinion. The Stoics may have believed that animals were there for our use, but none ever went out of their way state that one must eat meat. As we saw, Seneca and Musonius were vegetarians. It isn’t that they didn’t have reasons to be vegetarian. They simply didn’t have any Stoic reason to.

Is Vegetarianism Stoic?

Is X Stoic?  This is a question heard, perhaps, one too many times. And, honestly, it’s a senseless question. Nothing but Stoicism is Stoic. But I suppose the real question that’s being asked is would Stoics approve of x. This is the question that started the debate I had about vegetarianism to begin with.

The thing is, no matter how you look at it, the Stoics don’t “approve” of anything besides virtue. From TVs to jokes, the Stoics made it clear that anything that isn’t virtue isn’t good and anything that isn’t vice isn’t bad. In short, it’s all indifferent.

Diet is no exception.

No, vegetarianism isn’t Stoic. They wouldn’t approve of it, either. They won’t give you thumbs up and tell you not eating meat is the right, Stoic thing to do. But they aren’t against vegetarianism, either. What they’ll tell you is that animals are here for our use, but it’s up to you if eat them or not. You might think of some virtuous reasons to be a vegetarian, but they’ll remind you that it isn’t the same as being virtuous. Like any indifferent, it doesn’t make you a good or bad person.

Granted, the Stoics did have some outline some rules about eating, but outside of Musonius, there aren’t any true dietary restrictions. The Stoic “diet” is one of practicality and simplicity. Zeno ate frugally, which would preclude expensive, luxurious items. Epictetus proscribes moderation. Musonius believes food that are easy to get are the best. All of these can be used to justify almost any diet, not just vegetarianism.

So, eat your meat. Or don’t. Neither option is particularly Stoic.

Works Cited

  • Der Vegetarismus in der Antike by Johannes Haussleiter
  • Discourses by Epictetus
  • Dying Every Day by James Romm
  • Enchiridion by Epictetus
  • Letters from a Stoic by Seneca the Younger
  • Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers by Diogenes Laertius
  • Meditations by Marcus Aurelius
  • Musonius Rufus: Lectures and Sayings by Cynthia King
  • Vegetarianism in a Nutshell by The Vegetarian Resource Group

[1] This text only exists in German, so Google Translate was used to interpret text. I will avoid direct quotations from the book, paraphrasing Johannes Haussleiter where need be.

[2] Translated from German, so this may not be 100% accurate.

Jeremy Corter has been a life-long lover of philosophy. He runs a Stoicism blog, The Mad Stoic, which he sometimes remembers to update.  You can also find him online on Twitter and Google+