On Nature, do we need Zeus?

Dear Tony,

Thank you for your answer to the important question of how the Stoic idea of Nature may be brought up to date. If I understand correctly, your main thesis is that the idea of Zeus can imbue value and life into Stoic Nature in ways that would not be objectionable to atheists.

Perhaps. But this raises more questions for me. Why do we, as modern Stoics, need to import the idea at all? Why bother keeping aspects of Zeus in our idea of Nature? Personally, I think Zeus can be kept off modern Stoic concepts of Nature entirely.

The basis for my claim rests on two ideas. The first is that Stoic theology seems tacked on to Nature–and Stoic ethical theory more broadly–in a loose, unnecessary way. The second is that the ancients themselves provide us with many other viable alternatives to Nature beyond Zeus. To show you what I mean, let’s turn to one of your cardinal texts as an example: Seneca’s 124th letter.

There, Seneca describes the notion of good as it applies to humankind. He admits that the notion of good applies to plants and animals, but we call their perfection “good” “only by courtesy.” Plants’ and animals’ small-g “good” is simply that which accords with their nature. Seneca argues that these are not “true” or “real” goods, though, since “the real Good” can only occur in beings capable of reason. Two such beings exist according to Seneca: humans and God. They are of the same nature, “distinct only by virtue of the immortality of the one and the mortality of the other.” Otherwise, both are capable of instantiating the “true Good” due to their ability to reason.

No-true-Scotsman fallacy aside, notice that God is not needed here, but is simply tacked on as an example of a being capable of reason. Later on in Letter 124, Seneca explicitly states that “good can exist only in that which possesses reason.” Since human beings are capable of reason, they are capable of attaining Seneca’s capital-G “Good.” God is not needed for human beings to perfect their reason, or at least strive to do so. Zeus is a useful, inspirational ideal, perhaps–indeed, Seneca uses God’s possession of “a clear and flawless mind” in such a way–but not a necessity. Human beings are rational, so they are capable of Seneca’s capital-G good by his own reasoning, regardless of whether Zeus exists or not.

I believe a similar pattern of Zeus-as-appendage is found throughout many other texts. For example, Diogenes Laertius 7.88 states that “the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with Zeus, lord and ruler of all.” Again, Zeus is not needed to understand Nature, but is simply appended–an entity that is tacked on and equated with acting according to “right reason,” which in turn is equated with acting in accordance with our own human nature and that of the universe. Why should a modern atheistic Stoic not just stop at human and universal nature? And at 7.135, Zeus is equated with fate. Why not just stop at fate? Again, Zeus is simply assumed and equated with other concepts that could serve modern atheistic Stoics just as well as Zeus did for the ancients. Zeus seems vestigial.

The above excerpts from Diogenes Laertius provide some evidence for my second contention: that viable alternatives to Nature not involving Zeus exist in the ancient literature. An atheistic modern Stoic could easily make sense of concepts like human nature, universal nature, and fate (interpreted as determinism) without appeal to a divine intelligence. 

I could say more, but this is a letter, not a thesis! Thus, I’ll stop here.

But before I do, I want to make clear that my position is not that the ancient Stoics didn’t believe in Zeus. I strongly suspect that if I were able to summon the ghosts of Marcus, Seneca, or Epictetus, they would vehemently assert that Zeus was necessary for their understanding of Stoic Nature. But this is their ancient understanding, informed by ancient physics. If I were successful in summoning these spirits, I hope they would stick around to provide clear, coherent arguments for why the notion of Zeus is necessary for Stoic ethics and Stoic Nature. Because I’m unsure such an argument is present in the extant Stoic literature. But viable alternative understandings of Nature are.

Just because I don’t find Zeus necessary for a contemporary version of Stoic Nature does not mean a theologically-infused concept of Nature could not be useful to our theologically-inclined Stoic brethren. Your suggestions to use modern philosophy to update the ancient conception of Nature are viable, interesting, and possibly appealing to “traditional” Stoics in today’s world. I simply do not think a theologically-infused interpretation is necessary for contemporary Stoicism to be valid. 

Vale,
Greg Lopez