Unpacking the “dichotomy of control”

I’ll admit that among the Stoic authors, my favorite has always been Epictetus, but I completely agree with John that “many of the common misunderstandings of Stoicism are due to . . . the way in which certain statements of his are taken out of context and used as starting points for presentations of Stoic ideas.” I’d also agree that the so-called “dichotomy of control” is perhaps one of the most common and problematic of these. It takes actually studying Epictetus’s Enchiridion and Discourses, and correlating a great number of passages referencing, explaining, and unpacking this distinction between the eph’hēmon (up to us) and the ouk eph’hēmon (not up to us), to understand it rightly (you can find an article doing that here). Just looking at Enchiridion 1, as many people do, and then applying that discussion in a overly simplistic way certainly isn’t going to cut it!

A good bit of what I have to say here will largely be a supplement to John’s piece. I will make one point first, however, that I so often stress I expect some might quip: “Sadler’s back on his standard schtick again.” It is germane, though, and needs to be emphasized. Stoicism is a complex system of ideas that are interconnected with each other. When it is reduced to life hacks or sound-bite “quotes,” or even when more thoughtful people try to substitute some rules, principles, or general ideas they think sums it up, it ceases being Stoicism and morphs into something else, something both weaker and more likely to lead one dangerously astray. There’s a similar issue that arises from a different kind of mistake, namely thinking that a main concept or practice they like is somehow the key to Stoicism, the one idea to rule them all (. . . and “in the darkness” of foolishness, “bind them,” if we want to continue that analogy). 

The so-called “dichotomy of control” is definitely an important idea, and understood rightly, a very useful distinction to make and apply. But it is only one of dozens of such key ideas in Stoic philosophy. John rightly calls our attention to an entire set of other ideas we see discussed in a variety of Stoic texts, among them Cicero’s reinterpretation of the scholarch Panaetius’ Stoic ethics in On Duties. In that work we not only get in-depth analyses of the four cardinal virtues, each of which could be considered an idea just as important as the dichotomy of control. We get discussions of the interrelations of those virtues with each other, a developmental view of human nature that explains where inclinations that can be refined into the virtues arise from, and explanations of the difference between the morally good and the useful or expedient.

Of course, in the context of Epictetus’s larger work, when people read the Enchiridion and the longer and more important Discourses as a whole (and don’t let themselves get distracted by possibly dubious, but cool-sounding fragments), you see very clearly that the distinction of what is up to us and what is not up to us is just one of a number of other equally important ideas Epictetus himself is placing on the table, which include the famous “three fields,” the need to understand and clarify preconceptions, the importance of attending to habit, roles and relationships as ethically significant, understanding what indifferents are and how to use them rightly, and the interconnections between the prohairesis—the rational faculty—and the ruling faculty. Those who are paying close attention while they read Epictetus’s Discourses will realize that without adequately understanding these other key ideas, one is likely to get the “dichotomy of control” wrong in important respects, since these concepts are all interconnected.

As a quick side-note, I’d like to point out that while Epictetus explicitly makes the distinction between what is up to us and what is not up to us central to his Stoic teaching, he’s certainly not the only thinker to recognize the importance of that distinction. Earlier on, in his analyses of moral responsibility, Aristotle used those same Greek terms Epictetus employs, eph’hēmon and ouk eph’hēmon, as do a number of other later non-Stoic Greek authors. We also see Cicero and Seneca using similar Latin language, consistently making and using the distinction between what is in nostra potestate, i.e. “in our power” or “up to us,” and what is not.

It is arguably in Epictetus’s Discourses, though, where we see the fullest development of the implications and complexity of that distinction (arguably, since it does play an important role in one text where you would expect it to, Simplicius’s neo-Platonic Commentary on Epictetus’s Enchiridion). As mentioned earlier, far too many contemporary discussions or applications of the “dichotomy of control” just don’t put in the work, time, and reading necessary to adequately understand what Epictetus is actually telling us about this distinction.  What are they missing?  Since I’ve written an entire article about it linked to above, I won’t go through all of that, but just restrict myself to a few particularly glaring omissions.

First off, Epictetus tells us in Discourses 1.22 that what is and what is not up to us is among what he calls the “preconceptions” or “general conceptions” (proleipseis). That concept of “preconception” is not unique to Stoic philosophy, but it clearly plays an important role in Epictetus’s understanding. Among the other preconceptions he mentions are the good and the bad, useful and harmful, just and unjust, beautiful and ugly, holy and unholy, needed and unnecessary, and the appropriate and inappropriate (or duty and what is against duty). Understanding and applying these plays an absolutely central role in human life and happiness, for better or for worse. He tells us that we human beings all have these preconceptions, but they’re often mixed up and confused, so  that we have to do the considerable work of clarifying them, in order that we can properly apply them to particulars. Given that this is the case, we should be leery of anyone suggesting to us that the “dichotomy of control” is an easy, simple, and straightforward starting point for Stoicism that Epictetus helpfully provided us with in Enchiridion 1. By making the distinction one between two opposed preconceptions, Epictetus implies that we are probably going to misapply it at first.

Second, one way a lot of people go wrong with the dichotomy of control is by too easily saying to things that are externals and not up to us: “you don’t matter,” or “you’re nothing to me.” Does Epictetus really think that when it comes to the entire range of the indifferents, the externals that strictly speaking lie outside our control, that ought to be our attitude in every case? Very explicitly not! He has entire discussions focused on how we ought to deal with or use (khrēsthai, khrēsis) those things that are not up to us and are externals and indifferents. Discourses 2.1 and 2.5 are particularly rich in this respect, but you’ll find other similar points being made scattered throughout his works. Our attitudes towards, views about, actions and choices in relation to indifferents are not itself indifferent. This is a point that Seneca and Cicero also make, more explicitly framing the use of the indifferents in relation to the virtues, but developing a perspective that harmonizes well with Epictetus’s views. Again, ignore these interconnected matters, and the “dichotomy of control” becomes something one is likely to screw up.

Third and last, one concept Epictetus develops, uses, and makes central more than any other Stoic author whose works we possess is a notion I mentioned earlier, prohairesis, which typically gets translated as “faculty of choice,” “moral purpose,” or “the will” (the last of which can be a little bit misleading).  There’s a case that can be made that for Epictetus prohairesis is the same or substantively overlaps with the “ruling faculty” (to hēgemonikon), and the “rational faculty,” which I mention just because it gives you a sense of how vastly extended a scope this part of ourselves has, and how absolutely central it is to us as human beings. The prohairesis is the core of what a human being is, the complex part with which we make choices and commitments, in which habits are developed and undone, where the virtues or vices would reside. It is not only the domain of what is up to us, but determines what we do with what is up to us. Without adequately understanding what the prohairesis is and how it works, I’d say, one is bound to go wrong in interpreting the related dichotomy of control.

To sum up, perhaps John is right in advocating Cicero’s On Duties as a superior text to introduce people to basic ideas of Stoicism. I’m not entirely sure myself, since I tend to think that perhaps there’s no one single best text (I do have a piece with my own recommendations here, and you’ll notice that they’re plural). I do share his concerns about overly simplistic uses of the “dichotomy of control” derived from inadequate readings of Epictetus’s texts. But perhaps a more robustly developed interpretation of Epictetus’s distinction would bear better fruit for beginners, presented to them not as the one right place to start, but as one important and useful idea among many other interconnected ideas that they should look forward to studying and integrating.

Vale,
Greg