A Philosophical Sketch of Jason Xenakis (1923-1977) part 3 – by Christopher Lee

This article is the third in a series on the life and work of Jason Xenakis. A biographical sketch appeared here and a review of Xenakis’s monograph on Epictetus appeared here.

Jason Xenakis recognized the therapeutic potential of Stoicism and of philosophy as a way of life. Further, he was a pioneer in the development of an Existentialist Stoicism, tackling questions of freedom, meaning, absurdity and suicide in his work. He would return to those themes several times over his career, developing ideas based upon his interpretation of Stoicism and Existentialism.

Philosophical Influences

It is possible the greatest philosophical influence on Xenakis came through his attendance at the Saturday night meetings of Nikos Kazantzakis’ literary circle in Athens. The large group included people who would go on to become influential in philosophy, poetry, art, music and literature.[1] Freedom and suicide are strong themes in Kazantzakis’s work, as is finding meaning in an absurd world.  Several of his novels end with the protagonist committing suicide to either escape an intolerable situation or in response to living an ‘anti-aesthetic life’.[2] Kazantzakis was also familiar with the works of Epictetus, in 1943 giving a copy of the Enchiridion as a gift to the writer, Pandelis Prevelakis.

In 1948, while studying philosophy at Oberlin College, Ohio, Xenakis wrote his first article for publication, appearing in the Oberlin Yeoman magazine. The short article, ‘On the Futility of Improvement and the Conscious Life in General (A Sisyphean Solution for the Sisyphean Problem) referenced existential themes present in Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ and Camus’ ‘Myth of Sisyphus’. [3]  The article was perhaps Xenakis’ response to Camus’ 1942 essay, ‘The Myth of Sisyphus’,  the first lines of which are:

There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. All the rest— whether or not the world has three dimensions, whether the mind has nine or twelve categories—comes afterwards.[4]

In his article, Xenakis appears to be directly addressing directly Camus’ opening statement when he wrote:

“To define philosophy in terms of suicide is only a half-way process. Because the root of philosophy itself and in general of human life, as differing from the rest of nature—consciousness—is primarily defined in terms of this action. In fact, where there is just a possibility of self-annihilation, there, necessarily, consciousness is involved.”[5]

Despite being influenced by Existentialism he was by no means uncritical of it and rejected some aspects of Sartre’s approach to existential questions.

However, following this first article, it would be twenty years before Xenakis would return to the themes of freedom and suicide. Over the next couple of decades Xenakis produced numerous articles covering such diverse areas as Plato’s use of language, logic problems and ethics. During that time, he also explored ideas around whether the ‘good’ was synonymous with the concept of ‘God’ in Plato and concludes it is not.[6] This would lay the groundwork for later articles as well as his non-theological approach to Stoic ethics.

Approach to Philosophy

During a public debate at Louisiana State University (LSU) in April 1969 Xenakis laid out his views on the role of philosophy in society:

“There are two types of philosophers, Xenakis said. There is the pro-establishment philosopher, he said, who maintains that wisdom comes out of the establishment. Then, he said, there is the independent philosopher, who will not compromise his freedom of expression.

The ethical, independent philosopher is committed to speaking the truth and criticizing, he said, and cannot remain neutral.

Philosophy, Xenakis said, does not only describe the world, but supplies the needed criticism to effect change. Throughout history, he continued, philosophers, from the Epicureans to the Cynics and Stoics to Socrates, have been actively pursuing their doctrines. Unfortunately, he said, most professional philosophers are theoretical”[7]

Certainly, Xenakis saw himself as an ethical, independent philosopher who was not willing to compromise his freedom. He seems to have regarded himself as being cast in the mould of the likes of Socrates, the Cynics and the Stoics, as willing to take a stand in pursuit of philosophy as a way of life, not merely as an academic or theoretical pursuit. He regarded philosophy as the means through which society could, and should, be criticized and disrupted.

Xenakis also held the view there was no conflict between analytic and non-analytic philosophy, stating:

“Analytic and nonanalytic philosophy complement rather than compete with each other, the former by providing the latter with at least a tool, the latter by supplying the former with direction. Which shows too that they can coexist in the same thinker and moment of thought.”[8]

Xenakis suggests one such thinker in whom both forms of philosophy coexisted was Epictetus:

Since interest in substantive questions is interlaced in Epictetus with interest in logic and analysis, this may then prove that the split in current philosophy between analysts and non-analysts is unnecessary. Certainly it is not clear why a concern with language and concepts cannot combine with a concern with problems of life and death.”[9]

But, that said, Xenakis believed logic and analysis were important aspects of philosophical practice:

“For it is a fact that logical analysis is apt to destroy illusions and expose self-deceptions.”[10]

For Xenakis, logic was a means to arrive at ethics and ethics a means to attain freedom, with ataraxia and the practice of virtue being fundamentally utilitarian.[11] (In this, and subsequent uses, Xenakis is using the term ‘utilitarian’ to refer to something used for a functional or practical purpose, rather than the philosophy of Utilitarianism.)

It would appear Xenakis was attempting to straddle the line between an analytic, purely theoretical, philosopher and a non-analytic, ‘practical’ philosopher who taught a mode of life based upon philosophical principles. There is no doubt Xenakis taught Stoicism as a practical philosophy, to be lived, rather than a purely academic pursuit.

Xenakis had a quite distinctive and, at times, idiosyncratic style of expression, often using very short, clipped statements and at other times inserting 1960’s slang and colloquialisms. He would also often make up words or use them in quite different ways and engaged with the idea of replacing philosophical terms derived from Latin with ones derived from Greek.[12] He was extremely interested in the use of language, being an advocate of ordinary-language philosophy and writing several articles on the use of language to express philosophical concepts.

Interpretation of Stoicism

Xenakis began formulating his ideas on Epictetus and Stoicism in 1968 when he published the article ‘Logical Topics in Epictetus’.[13] This would go on to form the basis of Xenakis’ 1969 book, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, the first English language treatment of the philosophy of Epictetus.  He offered a comprehensive analysis of and, in places, a radical reinterpretation of Epictetus’ Stoic philosophy.

His Stoicism, as put forward in his book on Epictetus, and in his later articles, is different from the Modern Stoicism most people are familiar with:

“His Neo-Stoicism, on the other hand, is not orthodox Stoicism, but a peculiar eclecticism of Socraticism and most Socratic and Hellenistic currents such as Cynicism, Scepticism, Epicureanism and Cyrenaicism. He regarded Stoicism as an amalgam of heterogeneous elements. Thus, his Neo-Stoicism is a modern world- and life-view elaborated with the tools of analytical philosophy, seen under the needs of psychology and psychiatric researches, and experienced in an existential mood.”[14]

In many respects he prefigured Modern Stoicism by firmly rooting the practice of Stoicism not merely in philosophy as a way of life but also in therapeutic psychology. As such, Xenakis proposed using the philosophy of Epictetus as an antidote to the problems of living we all experience by framing it as way of life rather than simply a philosophy to be studied in an academic setting. Xenakis wrote in his book:

“…his (Epictetus’) diagnoses of problems in living and techniques for coping with those problems have been insufficiently appreciated.”[15]

And:

“The primary function of the intellect is not to speculate, but to solve problems in living.”[16]

Here, Xenakis appears to quite deliberately use the phrase, ‘problems in living’, a reference to the work of Thomas Szasz who proposed that mental illness should be reframed as ‘problems in living’ rather than having a purely biological basis.[17] Like Xenakis, Szasz was committed to radical freedom and was an advocate of the right to commit suicide.[18]

Xenakis also suggested that until ‘pills’ can erase anxiety and depression the techniques offered by Epictetus would remain relevant:

Admittedly Epictetus’ nonchemico-physical therapeutic techniques will be outmoded when (or if) anxiety, dejection, and the rest will all be erasable by means of an operation or shock treatment or electrical conditioning or a pill, etc. (Narcotics and alcohol, of course, have been put to such use since time immemorial.) But meanwhile, at any rate, apparently his techniques have still some use, not to mention the fact that rational education, another characteristic feature of his thought, will stay with man as long as man is rational; for indeed the denial of this is self-contradictory.”[19]

As seen in the above passage, Xenakis regarded rationality as being at the core of human life and suggested that merely by virtue of being human we are committed to being a Stoic:

The first term, Epictetus adds, entails being rational, so that by classifying oneself as a human being, one is committed to being a Stoic, that is, to regarding reason as sovereign.”[20]

He had little interest in Stoic metaphysics and advocated stripping Stoicism of its “mythological or metaphorical component(s)”[21]. He viewed the Stoic ‘God’ as ‘inoperative’, as the personification of an ideal rather than as an actual deity:

“I think Zeus and everything that goes with him are ethical gimmicks.”[22]

He suggests that removing Zeus or ‘God’ from Stoic ethics will not fundamentally alter the practice of, or the therapeutic aspects of the philosophy:

“But the text itself is often relatively clear that Zeus may be inoperative in Epictetus’ thought… for example, obeying Zeus amounts to being wise and realistic in the above senses – where, generally, though the ethics seems to be based on Zeus, the latter can be removed without affecting the former.”[23]

He also regarded the Stoic concept of fate as little more than a ‘coping mechanism’, something to use but not necessarily believe in, referring to it as “therapeutic preordination”.[24]

Xenakis divided ethics into two categories – happiness-orientated ethics and pain-orientated ethics. Happiness-orientated ethics (or ‘positive ethics’), he says, are concerned with how happiness, fulfilment, etc are attainable, while pain-orientated ethics (‘negative ethics’) are how to avoid or cope with unhappiness, distress, etc., going on to suggest  Epictetus’s ethics are ‘ataraxist or negative’.[25] He then divides negative ethics into a further two categories, that of preventative (anticipating and avoiding distress) and remedial (rectifying or alleviating distress) suggesting that if the preventative approach is successful, it obviates the need to resort to the remedial, but if both fail then ‘therapeutic suicide’ remains the last resort, the ultimate expression of ‘radical freedom’ and solution to all the ‘problems of living’.[26]

Xenakis also developed ideas regarding Epictetus’ advice not to become attached to or dependent upon externals:

“Remind yourself that what you love is ephemeral, and that nothing you love is yours to keep. The feeling of inalienable ownership is based on illusions. Handle life “as travellers treat an inn”. Call things your own as you call “hotel beds” your own. Be “loose,” not possessive.”[27]

Building further upon this idea in his later article ‘Freedom and the Tourist Philosopher’, he formulated what he termed a ‘tourist’ approach to life:

“Your self is what you put your heart in. Those things you might put less of your heart in you might call mine rather than me. You are not necessarily your body, sex, sexuality (sorry Freud), profession, nationality, or what have you. This makes for freedom. This sums up the tourist outlook on life. So, take it or leave it. Live and let live. Do your thing. Travel light, live light for sooner or later everything flips (save that). Have only weekend relations. Don’t accumulate, improvise instead, so you can flee at a moment’s notice. Be a life visitor, not a junk collector. The idea being anyway, that what counts in the end is not how many things you have, but how much of your heart you put into them. How you feel when they are gone. Be easy going. Love them and leave them.”[28]

And:

“…everything should be treated transiently like guests treat a motel. Which makes ‘I lost it’ mean ‘I didn’t own it to begin with I merely used it.’“[29]

Despite being influenced by Existentialism, Xenakis was quite critical of Sartre. In his 1974 article ‘Freedom and the Tourist Philosopher’, Xenakis took aim at Existentialism and again presented suicide as an act of freedom:

“Sartre’s reader may get the impression that his existentialism makes us free. But there is a confusion. In fact, man in his existentialism is crushed not only by responsibility and anxiety but also despair, nausea and desertion and God knows what else. Can’t even split. Yet splitting would be an act of freedom. Which too shows that this was not the kind of freedom Sartre – or any other existentialist – is interested in.”[30]

Further, Xenakis suggested that the Stoicism of Epictetus had more to offer than the Existentialism of Sartre:

“Epictetus allows for more freedom than even existentialism does. Absurdity, anguish, nausea, abandonment, despair, he would say, are not necessary.”[31]

So, decades before any current interest in Stoicism or in combining it with Existentialism, he created what has been termed ‘Post-Existentialist Neo-Stoicism’, though this label was applied some years after his death but well before the rise of the Modern Stoicism movement.[32]

In his book on Epictetus and later articles, Xenakis focussed on three key areas he regarded as central to his interpretation and application of Stoicism and Existentialism: freedom, absurdity and ‘therapeutic suicide’.

Freedom

In Xenakis’ interpretation of Stoicism, he suggests Epictetus advocates freedom as the highest good, which stands in contrast to the traditional Stoic view of virtue as the highest good:

“Epictetus’ high praise of freedom – “freedom is the highest good” – is likewise the result of his generally conceiving of freedom as freedom from fear, hang-ups, disturbance. Freedom is typically compared with peace of mind and spontaneity, and typically contrasted with anguish and the feelings of stress and constraint. If a man is free, he does not feel hindered or driven, he is serene and happy. If a man is not free, he feels bothered, he is not serene or happy.”[33]

He regarded virtue as a means to attain freedom, that, “…the function of virtue is to make for worrylessness and happiness.”[34] He also stated, “The “promise” and “function” of “virtue” are also utilitarian. And the function of “reason” is not to make us unhappy.[35]

In his later work he also drew on Cynicism as well as the philosophy of the then current Hippie movement. He was of the view the “’Best’ ethics today happens among hippies (and relatives) rather than in philosophy departments.”[36]

He defined freedom as:

“… (the) ideal is ‘negative’ freedom, freedom as an excluder: freedom from all kinds of pressures, essentially inner: freedom from authority, duties, egodependence, obsessions, fears, worries, boredom, having to live.”[37]

So, for Xenakis, freedom was synonymous with ataraxia, or as he characterises it, ‘unfazedness’.[38] As mentioned above, Xenakis regarded suicide as an expression of radical freedom, that being ready to die, essentially makes one free.[39]

Absurdity and Meaning

In his approach to the issue of meaning, Xenakis was again, heavily influenced by Existentialism, particularly by Camus’ concept of the absurd. He regarded it as ‘absurd’ and counterproductive to take life too seriously, stating:

Anybody who takes life, and therefore philosophy, seriously can’t be serious. Life is a joke. At any rate, this is a possible or even a realistic attitude, if taking life seriously is inviting disappointment and bitterness.”[40]

In an article in 1968, he wrote, with characteristic bluntness, on the issue of seeking meaning in life:

“To say this however, is not to say that life is “meaningless” or “absurd.” It may be both if you don’t enjoy life, but if you do, it is absurd to say life is absurd. Or it might be that those who say that life is meaningless mean that meaning has to be given to them, rather than attained by them. (The parasite’s philosophy.)”[41]

He would go on to formulate his own, quite individualistic ideas about meaning and absurdity in the context of Stoicism, combining elements of Epictetus and Existentialism.  Drawing also upon the ideas of Heraclitus and the Cynics, Xenakis suggested that life was a ‘game’, not something to be taken seriously:

Since things are in flux don’t look for literal ends. Focus on activities instead. There are no finishings. Life is process….Be easygoing, a hobby artist. Life is a game, or as the Cynic would say, a big joke.”[42]

In formulating these ideas, he built upon Epictetus’ metaphor of life being a ‘festival’ or a ‘game’, even possibly working in a reference related to his love of tennis:

“If life is a game, value resides in what one does with life, rather than in life itself. “Life” is “indifferent”: it is “the use made of life,” not life as such, that matters. Life per se is a “material,” not an end in itself. Life is not the important thing: how one plays it is the important thing. Life should be treated the way a ball player treats the ball: “indifferently”; for his interest lies elsewhere, namely in how he handles the ball.”[43]

As such, he regarded a non-serious attitude to life as essential to avoiding mental distress:

“The unserious life knows no disaster, calamity, tragedy, despair. These concepts are foreign to it and empty. If you are not serious about anything, nothing fazes you (you enjoy ataraxia).”[44]

On the basis of this approach, Xenakis interprets the expression ‘be stoic’ to suggest you should not take things too seriously, that to be serious is to make oneself vulnerable and to surrender your peace of mind, and thus freedom, to external events, and as such we should adopt the ‘tourist’ approach to life.[45]

Therapeutic Suicide

The related issues of freedom and suicide deeply interested Xenakis, becoming known during his lifetime as ‘The Philosopher of Suicide’.[46] Building on the ideas of absurdity and life as a game, Xenakis went on to develop ideas around rational suicide and the therapeutic potential of suicide. If life was a game, he reasoned, it was not meant to be taken seriously, it was to be played, to be engaged in only as long as it was worthwhile. Drawing together his ideas regarding freedom, meaning and suicide he wrote:

“For, as I hope to show, when he (Epictetus) compares life to a game he does so in the last analysis both to suggest that the point of living is fun and that nevertheless there is an escape if living is not fun. And by escape he means death, self-inflicted death. In other words, he exploits the double meaning of “game,” namely (1) entertainment (eudaimonism) and (2) freedom even to quit a game (suicide).”[47]

As such, he reasoned:

“If life is a game, it is not sacred. Death may be welcomed and suicide permitted.”[48]

In his book on Epictetus and subsequent articles, he framed suicide in therapeutic terms:

“We think we have to live or go on living in a certain way, when nobody forces us to do so. We don’t even have to live if we don’t want to. The door is open. Even suicide in Epictetus is an expression of freedom.[49]

And:

“… If life is a game, it would be absurd to go on living if living turns out to be intolerable; as absurd as going on playing a boring game or staying at a silly party or (one might add) finishing a dull novel”.[50]

In his 1972 article, ‘A Noncommittal Philosophy’, Xenakis drew upon the Skepticism of the Pyrrhonists in reference to the therapeutic aspects of suicide:

“Of course, as we saw, the Pyrrhonist might choose self-kill; so that he doesn’t strictly “have” to act, to “live.” He can split. Sextus’ acceptance of suicide fits in with his conception of the skeptical frame of mind as one of taking it easy, unuptightness, freedom – though neither suicide nor freedom (whether in the sense of liberation or responsibility) is stressed by him, certainly not to the extent they are stressed by Diogenes or Epictetus.”[51]

In his discussion of suicide, Xenakis also referred to Hegesias:

“…the death-therapist Hegesias (though officially neither a Cynic nor a Stoic but a Cyrenaic) was, according to Cicero, so successful in proposing suicide as a pain killer that Ptolemy the King closed down his suicide clinic. Governments are by nature anti-suicide. They need armies. In fact, its attitude to suicide is a good indication of how humanitarian a given society is.”[52]

In an era of increasing calls for access to voluntary euthanasia and the right to die with dignity it is perhaps time we revisited the work of Xenakis and regard rational suicide in the same way he did, as the ultimate expression of freedom.

Legacy

In his final years, Xenakis was working on a book on Wittgenstein and logical analysis which he considered to be his best work. At the time of his death this book was likely largely complete and existed in manuscript form. However, following his death, all of his books and papers passed into the hands of a friend and colleague from Deree College, Prof. George Giannaris of the English department.[53] Giannaris was a prolific writer and collector, amassing a collection of over 15,000 books and over 4,000 volumes of papers, along with paintings, and recordings.[54] When he died in 2015 his entire collection was donated to the University of Crete. However, repeated requests to the University of Crete library to discover if Xenakis’ papers are indeed within Giannaris’ collection have so far proved fruitless. It is entirely possible such a huge collection is yet to be catalogued and it would be a time-consuming task to sift through all of the papers to locate the manuscript of Xenakis’ final book. However, perhaps one day, a researcher will be able to locate Xenakis’ papers and hopefully among them will be the manuscript of his book.

Xenakis lived in a time of great social, cultural and political change, and he brought an unorthodox, non-dogmatic and non-theistic approach to the study of philosophy and the application of Stoicism. At times, Xenakis’ philosophy is neither comfortable nor comforting. While he was influenced by both Stoicism and Existentialism, he was by no means beholden to either and at times was critical of both.

In the forty-seven years following his death, there has been only one article written about Xenakis and his philosophy though some of his articles have continued to be referenced.[55] However, despite his work having been largely forgotten by all except those who knew him, perhaps his legacy can best be assessed by the impact he had upon those he came into contact with. Many of his former students remembered him as someone who had a tremendous influence upon them by opening their minds to ideas and ways of thought that would go on to shape their lives.  As such, perhaps we can say that Xenakis has been the most influential Stoic philosopher of modern times in that for the better part of the last fifty years his former students have been living aspects of the philosophy he taught, bringing it into the world, their relationships and subsequent generations.[56]  Hopefully these two modest articles on the life and philosophy of Jason Xenakis will allow a new generation to discover and appreciate his work.

[1] Attendees included Konstantinos Despotopoulos, philosopher and latter a member of the Academy of Athens and Minister of Education; Ntimis Apostolopoulos, essayist and philosopher; Dimitris Doukaris, writer, poet and publisher; Mimika Kranaki, writer; Kostas Akselos, philosopher; Kornelius Kastoriadis, philosopher; Thaleia Kalligianni, artist; Sofia Mauroeidi-Papadaki, musician.

[2] Bien, Peter, -“Kazantzakis, Volume 1 – Politics of the Spirit”, Princeton University Press (2012), p.8

[3] Xenakis, Jason, ‘On the Futility of Improvement and of Conscious Life in General: A Sisyphean Solution for the Sisyphean Problem’, YEOMAN, Oberlin College, 1948

[4] Camus, Albert, ‘The Myth of Sisyphus’, translated by Justin O’Brien. New York: Vintage Books, 1991. p.1

[5] Xenakis, Jason, ‘On the Futility of Improvement and of Conscious Life in General: A Sisyphean Solution for the Sisyphean Problem’, YEOMAN, Oberlin College, 1948

[6] Xenakis, Jason, ‘On the Theological Interpretation of Plato’s Ethics’, HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol. 50, No. 1, 1957

[7] The Daily Reveille, 30 April, 1969

[8] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.130

[9] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.129

[10] Xenakis, Jason, ‘Alive Philosophy’, THE DAILY REVEILLE, March. 1968

[11] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.29-30

[12] Some of the terms Xenakis used were, telic, axic, criteric. theic, somatogenic, noogenic, protoconcept, cacodicy, algodicy, etc. See: Myrto Dragona-Monachou, ‘The Post-Existentialist Neo-Stoicism Of Jason Xenakis And The Stoic Theory Of Suicide’, 1981, p.64

[13] Xenakis, Jason, ‘Logical Topics in Epictetus’, SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 1968

[14] Myrto Dragona-Monachou, ‘The Post-Existentialist Neo-Stoicism Of Jason Xenakis And The Stoic Theory Of Suicide’, 1981, p.65

[15] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, IX

[16] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.22

[17] Szasz, Thomas, “The Myth of Mental Illness”, Harper & Rowe, 1960, p.25

[18] Szasz, Thomas, “The Ethics of Suicide”, The Antioch Review, 1971

[19] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.128

[20] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.70

[21] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.126

[22] Xenakis, Jason, ‘Stoic Suicide Therapy’, 1972, Sophia, 1972, p.90

[23] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.55

[24] Xenakis, Jason, ‘Stoic Suicide Therapy’, 1972, Sophia, 1972, p.90

[25] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.83

[26] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.72

[27] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.96

[28] Xenakis, Jason, ‘Freedom and the Tourist Philosopher’, Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy, Varna, 1974.

[29] Xenakis, Jason, ‘Stoic Suicide Therapy’, 1972, Sophia, 1972, p.90

[30] Xenakis, Jason, ‘Freedom and the Tourist Philosopher’, Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy, Varna, 1974.

[31] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.129

[32] Myrto Dragona-Monachou, ‘The Post-Existentialist Neo-Stoicism Of Jason Xenakis And The Stoic Theory Of Suicide’, 1981

[33] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.15

[34] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.115

[35] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.14

[36] Xenakis, Jason, ‘Hippies and Cynics’, AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 1973, p.1

[37] Xenakis, Jason, ‘Hippies and Cynics’, AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 1973, p.14-15

[38] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.81

[39] Xenakis, Jason, ‘Hippies and Cynics’, An Interdisciplinary Journal Of Philosophy, 1973, p.9

[40] Xenakis, Jason, ‘Alive Philosophy’, THE DAILY REVEILLE, March. 1968

[41] Xenakis, Jason, ‘Alive Philosophy’, THE DAILY REVEILLE, March. 1968

[42] Xenakis, Jason, ‘Stoic Suicide Therapy’, 1972, Sophia, 1972, p.97

[43] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.19

[44] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.24

[45] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.24

[46] Xenakis, Jason, “Hippies and Cynics”, Apopira Publications, Athens, 1976, introduction by Leonidas Christakis, p.8

[47] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.12

[48] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.16

[49] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.129

[50] Xenakis, Jason, “Epictetus Philosopher – Therapist”, Martius-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, p.13

[51] Xenakis, Jason, Noncommittal Philosophy, Journal of Thought, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1972, p.200

[52] Xenakis, Jason, ‘Hippies and Cynics’, AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 1973, p.9

[53] Myrto Dragona-Monachou, ‘The Post-Existentialist Neo-Stoicism Of Jason Xenakis And The Stoic Theory Of Suicide’, 1981, p.56

[54] https://www.thenationalherald.com/george-giannaris-lost-greek-bridge-between-worlds/

[55] Myrto Dragona-Monachou, ‘The Post-Existentialist Neo-Stoicism Of Jason Xenakis And The Stoic Theory Of Suicide’, 1981

[56] Transcript Wayne Babovich, former student of Jason Xenakis, in Zoom conversation with Judith Stove and Christopher Lee, 19 December 2023.

Christopher Lee is a writer and researcher living in the Sunshine Coast Hinterland, Queensland, Australia. He studied ancient and modern history and philosophy at the University of Queensland. He has written several historical articles on a variety of subjects ranging from local history to events of the 1913 Dublin Lockout, the Irish War of Independence, and the Irish Civil War.  He has a long-standing interest in the ancient philosophical schools and in modern existentialism.

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